Noûs 52 (4):796-807 (2018)

Authors
Carolina Sartorio
University of Arizona
Abstract
Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution.
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12212
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References found in this work BETA

Causation.David Lewis - 1986 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Philosophical Papers Ii. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission.Phil Dowe - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):216 – 226.
Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism.Dana K. Nelkin - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reasons‐Sensitivity and Degrees of Free Will.Alex Kaiserman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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