Tecendo uma teia: aquisição de conceitos e papel inferencial

Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 57 (3):138-162 (2012)
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Abstract

Theories of concepts and concept acquisition are mutually constraining. How we envisage concept acquisition depends both on what we take concepts to be and what skills we can employ to acquire them. I argue that Ned Block’s cognitivist approach to concept acquisition is not compatible with his vision of conceptual role semantics. If concepts are defined by their conceptual roles, then the acquisition of new concepts will change the conceptual roles of concepts employed in any form of hypothesis formation and confirmation learning. This breaks the evidentiary link between the concepts acquired and the evidence used to justify its subsequent applications. As a consequence, conceptual role semantics cannot avail itself of cognitivist approaches to concept acquisition. Despite this, they may nevertheless explain the apparent rational nature of much concept acquisition

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John Sarnecki
University of Toledo

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References found in this work

Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Mad pain and Martian pain.David Lewis - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press. pp. 216-222.
A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.

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