A sensitivity to good questions: A virtue-based approach to questioning

Episteme 13 (3):329-341 (2016)


This paper argues for a virtue-based account of questioning. First, it delineates the unreflective yet rational aspects of questioning and demonstrates that questions can be obtained not only in reflective but also in unreflective processes. This paper then argues that the unreflective yet rational mode of inquirers in questioning can be characterized by an automatic response to good questions and cues for relevant doubt and further questions, the active and standby modes of responsiveness, and emotional stress on cues for relevant doubt and further questions. Finally, this article outlines how these features can fully be explicated in terms of exercising a sensitivity to good questions as a virtue.

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Kunimasa Sato
CUNY Graduate Center

References found in this work

Virtue Epistemology.Heather Battaly - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.
"Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology".Guy Axtell - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1--27.
Epistemology Futures.Stephen Hetherington (ed.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Virtues in Epistemology.John Greco - 2002 - In Paul Moser (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 287--315.

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Citations of this work

An Interpersonal-Epistemic Account of Intellectual Autonomy: Questioning, Responsibility, and Vulnerability.Kunimasa Sato - 2018 - Tetsugaku: International Journal of the Philosophical Association of Japan 2:65-82.

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