Acta Analytica 33 (1):69-83 (2018)

Authors
Mark Satta
Wayne State University
Abstract
The ambiguity theory of “knows” is the view that knows and its cognates have more than one propositional sense—i.e., more than one sense that can properly be used in “knows that” etc. constructions. The ambiguity theory of “know” has received relatively little attention as an account of the truth-conditions for knowledge ascriptions and denials—especially compared to views like classical, moderate invariantism and epistemic contextualism. In this paper, it is argued that the ambiguity theory of knows has an advantage over both classical, moderate invariantism and epistemic contextualism. This advantage is that it is the only one of these views that can account for “diverging knowledge responses without inconsistency” —i.e., cases in which, for the same subject S and proposition p, one and the same speaker says truly “S knows p” but instead could have truly said “S does not know p” and vice versa. This paper argues both for the existence of DRWI scenarios and the ability of the ambiguity theory of knows to best explain their existence.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-017-0324-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Ambiguity in Architecture.Christoph Baumberger - 2009 - In G. Ernst, O. Scholz & J. Steinbrenner (eds.), Nelson Goodman: From Logic to Art. Ontos. pp. 293--319.
A Linguistic Grounding for a Polysemy Theory of ‘Knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1163-1182.
Jaffray’s Ideas on Ambiguity.Peter P. Wakker - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (1):11-22.
The One Fallacy Theory.Lawrence H. Powers - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (2).
Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence.Steven Gimbel - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):269-285.
Typical Ambiguity and Elementary Equivalence.Daniel Dzierzgowski - 1993 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 39 (1):436-446.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-04-13

Total views
64 ( #166,817 of 2,448,697 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #63,932 of 2,448,697 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes