Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):137-154 (2021)

Authors
Hanno Sauer
Utrecht University
Abstract
ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that recent evidence regarding the psychological basis of moral cognition supports a form of moral abolitionism. I identify three main problems undermining the epistemic quality of our moral judgments – contamination, reliability, and bad incentives – and reject three possible responses: neither moral expertise, nor moral learning, nor the possibility of moral progress succeed in solving the aforementioned epistemic problems. The result is a moderate form of moral abolitionism, according to which we should make fewer moral judgments much more carefully.
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2021.1908580
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References found in this work BETA

Against Democracy: New Preface.Jason Brennan - 2016 - Princeton University Press.
Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds.Edouard Machery - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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