Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge

Synthese 176 (3):345-359 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,446

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-05-30

Downloads
357 (#49,079)

6 months
8 (#154,104)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrea Sauchelli
Lingnan University

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Don Ross, David Spurrett & John G. Collier.
Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 50 references / Add more references