Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge
Synthese 176 (3):345-359 (2010)
Abstract
The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.Author's Profile
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10.1007/s11229-009-9571-3
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Citations of this work
Modal Fictionalism, Possible Worlds, and Artificiality.Andrea Sauchelli - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):411-21.
Comparative syllogism and counterfactual knowledge.Linton Wang & Wei-Fen Ma - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1327-1348.
References found in this work
Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2). Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
