Fairness between competing claims

Res Publica 16 (1):41-55 (2010)
Ben Saunders
University of Southampton
Fairness is a central, but under-theorized, notion in moral and political philosophy. This paper makes two contributions. Firstly, it criticizes Broome’s seminal account of fairness in Proc Aristotelian Soc 91:87–101, showing that there are problems with restricting fairness to a matter of relative satisfaction and holding that it does not itself require the satisfaction of the claims in question. Secondly, it considers the justification of lotteries to resolve cases of ties between competing claims, which Broome claims as support for his theory, and contrasts random procedures to contests of skill, which may also be considered lotteries in a broader sense. I offer no alternative account of fairness of my own, but hope to point the way for future research on the nature of fairness
Keywords Allocation  Claims  Fairness  Justice  Lotteries
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DOI 10.1007/s11158-010-9118-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Idea of Justice.Amartya Sen - 2009 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Rescuing Justice and Equality.G. A. Cohen (ed.) - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-135.

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Citations of this work BETA

On Fairness and Claims.Patrick Tomlin - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (2):200-213.
To Be Fair.Benjamin L. Curtis - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):47-57.
Fairness and Aggregation.A. C. Paseau & Ben Saunders - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (4):460-469.

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