Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions

Analysis 69 (1):174-176 (2009)

Authors
Jennifer Saul
University of Sheffield
Abstract
Philosophers of language have long recognized that in opaque contexts, such as those involving propositional attitude reports, substitution of co-referring names may not preserve truth value. For example, the name ‘Clark Kent’ cannot be substituted for ‘Superman’ in a context like:1. Lois believes that Superman can flywithout a change in truth value. In an earlier paper, Jennifer Saul demonstrated that substitution failure could also occur in ‘simple sentences’ where none of the ordinary opacity-producing conditions existed, such as:2. Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent does.Accounts focusing on opacity were unable to explain our ‘anti-substitution intuitions’ in such cases.In Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions, Saul extends her earlier work. She provides a comprehensive presentation and criticism of recent accounts of simple sentence substitution failure, and proposes a new approach drawing on psychological evidence about cognitive processing. Saul's purpose is not merely to solve the substitution puzzle cases, but to make …
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/ann025
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 44,419
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.
Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Classical Opacity.Michael Caie, Jeremy Goodman & Harvey Lederman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Broadest Necessity.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (5):733-783.
Frege’s Puzzle is About Identity After All.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):628-643.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Pragmatic Treatment of Simple Sentences.Alex Barber - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):300–308.
The Phone Booth Puzzle.Bjørn Jespersen - 2006 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 13 (4):411-439.
Intuition and the Substitution Argument.Richard G. Heck - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):1-30.
Simple Sentences, Speech Acts, and the 'Enlightenment Problem'.Gerry Hough - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (4):539-546.
Believing in Words.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2001 - Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.
On Non-Pragmatic Millianism.Andrea Onofri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.
J. Saul, Simple Sentences, Substitution And Intuitions.Barbora Geistová Čakovská - 2008 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 15 (4):541-545.
What’s in Two Names?T. Ede Zimmermann - 2005 - Journal of Semantics 22 (1):53-96.
Puzzling Pairs.Michael Nelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):109 - 119.
Substitution and Simple Sentences.Jennifer M. Saul - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):102–108.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-02-20

Total views
15 ( #558,878 of 2,271,941 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #205,765 of 2,271,941 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature