Why the Predicativist Calling Account Fails: Names Can Never Hurt You

Abstract

Recently, and rather startlingly, given the history of the debate about a name's semantic content, some claim that names are in fact predicates -- predicativism. Some of predicativists claim that a name's semantic content involves the concept of being called -- calling accounts that have been traditionally meta-linguistic. However, these accounts fail to be informative. Inspired by Burge's claim that proper names are literally true of the individuals that have them, Fara develops a non-meta-linguistic concept of being called analysed in terms of property attributions. I offer seven separate reasons for rejecting the account, one of which is that Fara's development of the view, at least, has implausible consequences for a theory of name acquisition. I sketch an alternative account of name acquisition that is meta-linguistic in nature, but because it is not offered as a theory of name's content, the standard worries fail to apply. In fact, I argue that an account of name acquisition must be meta-linguistic, and therefore a more nuanced conception of meta-linguistic speech acts is required. The account invokes Austin's performative-constative distinction. It analyses name acquisition as due to performative meta-linguistic speech acts.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Calling names.J. Biro - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):285-293.
On the linguistic complexity of proper names.Ora Matushansky - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):573-627.
Indexinames.Alberto Voltolini - 1995 - In J. Hill & P. Kot'attko (eds.), Karlovy Vary Studies in Reference and Meaning. Filosofia. pp. 258-285.
Geach on Proper Names.David Boersema - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:37-42.
Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity.Mark Textor - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
Causality, referring, and proper names.David S. Schwarz - 1978 - Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):225 - 233.
The significance of names.Robin Jeshion - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (4):370-403.
Niby-fakty i niby-mity.Tadeusz Ciecierski - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (2).
Proper names as rigid presuppositions.Emar Maier - 2007 - In Estella Puig-Waldmüller (ed.), Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung 11. pp. 418-32.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-09-29

Downloads
524 (#19,368)

6 months
19 (#57,517)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.

View all 30 references / Add more references