Abstract

Virtue, its importance and place within ethical theory, is currently of great philosophical interest. My thesis is that virtue has a primacy in ethical theory and that the virtue of benevolence is the primary virtue. I hope the considerations put forward will serve to continue the philosophical discussion on virtue and its role in ethical theory. ;The first two chapters of this thesis are introductory. In the first, I sketch some reasons for my discontent with ethical theories in which actions are considered independently from the person acting. In the second, I review how ascribing a virtue to something is analyzed by various philosophers of science. I disagree that dispositional properties are adequately explained in these analyses. In neither chapter, however, do I claim to have refuted the views considered. My intent is to provide a background for the ensuing discussion and to raise doubts sufficient to encourage pursuing alternatives. ;If virtue has a primacy in ethical theory, then we should have some notion of what virtue is. In Chapter III, I review what some contemporary moral philosophers take virtue to be. In Chapter IV, while reviewing Aristotle's and Sartre's views on what virtue is, I give an account of the nature of virtue as an actual quality or state and of our epistemic access to it. ;One major objection against a virtue ethics is that it seems impossible to identify which qualities are virtues. In Chapter V, I consider some of the criteria used by contemporary philosophers to identify qualities as virtues. In Chapter VI, I propose the criterion I believe can be used to identify the primary virtue, benevolence. I then propose how one could construct a framework for an ethical theory in which benevolence has primacy