Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):358-78 (1999)
The Content Sceptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Sceptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism.
|Keywords||Epistemology Externalism Introspection Knowledge|
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Citations of this work BETA
Brown on Self-Knowledge and Discriminability1.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301-314.
Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.Matthew Kennedy - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
Semantic Externalism, Authoritative Self-Knowledge, and Adaptation to Slow Switching.Andrew F. Smith - 2003 - Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):71-87.
Social Externalism and the Problem of Communication.Joey Pollock - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3229-3251.
Introspective Availability.John Kulvicki - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):208-228.
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