Concepts, conceptions and self-knowledge

Erkenntnis (y) (2019)

Authors
Sarah Sawyer
University of Sussex
Abstract
Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. In this paper, I argue for a novel theory of self-knowledge: the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a con-scious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind.
Keywords Concepts  Conceptions  Self-Knowledge  Mind  Content externalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00109-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony, Gareth Evans & John McDowell - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Contrastive Self-Knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):139-152.
On the Distinction Between the Concept of God and Conceptions of God.Eberhard Herrmann - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (2):63 - 73.
Interests and the Growth of Knowledge.Barry Barnes - 1977 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Knowing the Facts.Mark Textor - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):75-86.
Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge.Arthur Coleman Danto - 1968 - Cambridge University Press.
Young Children's Conceptions of Knowledge.Rachel Dudley - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12494.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-02-15

Total views
52 ( #145,771 of 2,235,423 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #10,215 of 2,235,423 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature