Collins' core fine-tuning argument

Collins (The Blackwell companion to natural theology, 2009) presents an argument he calls the ‘core fine-tuning argument’. In this paper, I show that Collins’ argument is flawed in at least two ways. First, the structure, depending on likelihoods, fails to establish anything about the posterior probability of God’s existence given fine-tuning. As an argument for God’s existence, this is a serious failing. Second, his analysis of what is appropriately restricted background knowledge, combined with the credences of a specially chosen ‘alien’, do not allow him to establish the premise \( \Pr (LPU \mid NSU~ \& ~k') \ll 1\)
Keywords God  Fine-tuning argument  Design
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-014-9453-6
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References found in this work BETA
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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