Collins' core fine-tuning argument

Authors
Mark Douglas Saward
Monash University
Abstract
Collins (The Blackwell companion to natural theology, 2009) presents an argument he calls the ‘core fine-tuning argument’. In this paper, I show that Collins’ argument is flawed in at least two ways. First, the structure, depending on likelihoods, fails to establish anything about the posterior probability of God’s existence given fine-tuning. As an argument for God’s existence, this is a serious failing. Second, his analysis of what is appropriately restricted background knowledge, combined with the credences of a specially chosen ‘alien’, do not allow him to establish the premise \( \Pr (LPU \mid NSU~ \& ~k') \ll 1\)
Keywords God  Fine-tuning argument  Design
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11153-014-9453-6
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,484
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-04-27

Total downloads
89 ( #69,752 of 2,267,135 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #145,157 of 2,267,135 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature