In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge, UK: pp. 75-93 (2015)

Authors
Sarah Sawyer
University of Sussex
Abstract
In this paper I argue first, that a contrastive account of self-knowledge and the propositional attitudes entails an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts, second, that the final account provides a solution to the McKinsey paradox, and third, that the account has the resources to explain why certain anti-skeptical arguments fail.
Keywords Self-Knowledge  Externalism  Skepticism  McKinsey Paradox
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Perceptual Entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.

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Citations of this work BETA

Subjective Externalism.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (1):4-22.

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