In defense of Burge's thesis

Philosophical Studies 107 (2):109-28 (2002)
Burge's thesis is the thesis that certain second-order self-ascriptions are self-verifying in virtue of their self-referential form. The thesis has recently come under attack on the grounds that it does not yield a theory of self-knowledge consistent with semantic externalism, and also on the grounds that it is false. In this paper I defend Burge's thesis against both charges, in particular against the arguments of Bernecker, Gallois and Goldberg. The alleged counterexamples they provide are merely apparent counterexamples, and the thesis is adequate to its proper task. To think otherwise is simply to misunderstand the thesis
Keywords Epistemology  Self-knowledge  Self-reference  Semantic Externalism  Bernecker, S  Burge, T  Gallois, A  Goldberg, S
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Asa Maria Wikforss (2008). Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Content. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):399-424.
John Kulvicki (2010). Introspective Availability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):208-228.
Finn Spicer (2009). On Always Being Right (About What One is Thinking). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 137-160.

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