Philosophical Studies 144 (3):447 - 456 (2009)

Rebecca Saxe
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. I argue that there is substantial evidence for co-opted mechanisms, leading from one individual’s mental state to a matching state in an observer, but there is no evidence that the output of these co-opted mechanisms serve as the basis for mental state attributions. There is also substantial evidence for attribution mechanisms that serve as the basis for mental state attributions, but there is no evidence that these mechanisms receive their input from co-opted mechanisms.
Keywords Theory of mind  Simulation theory  Mirror neurons  Mentalizing  Temporo-parietal junction  Medial prefrontal cortex
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9353-2
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References found in this work BETA

Against Simulation: The Argument From Error.R. Saxe - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-79.

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Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Imagination.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
Neural Resonance: Between Implicit Simulation and Social Perception.Marc Slors - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):437-458.

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