Austin and perception
Acta Analytica 16 (27):169-193 (2001)
Some of Austin's general statements about the doctrines of sense-datum philosophy are reviewed. It is concluded that Austin thought that in these doctrines "directly see" is given a new but inadequately explained and defined use. Were this so, the philosophical use of "directly see" would lack a definite sense and this would correspondingly affect the doctrines. They would lack definite truth-value. Against this, it is argued that the philosopher's use of "directly see" does not support Austin's general thesis that the sense-datum doctrines lack truth-value.
|Keywords||Metaphysics Perception Sense Data Truth Value Austin|
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