Iyyun 52 (July):290-300 (2003)
This paper reaches the conclusion that, while there are ordinary cases in which the pretending possibility is reasonable, these cases always contain some element that makes it reasonable. This will be the element we ask for when we ask why pretending possibility is raised. Knowledge that someone else is in pain is a matter of eliminating the proposed element or neutralizing its pain-negating aspect.
|Keywords||knowing other minds applying concepts pretending|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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