Facta Philosophica 5:173-182 (2003)
Hilary Putnam suggests that the essence of the realist conception of mathematics is that the statements of mathematics are objective so that the true ones are objectively true. An argument for mathematical realism, thus conceived, is implicit in Putnam's writing. The first premise is that within currently accepted science there are objective truths. Next is the premise that some of these statements logically imply statements of pure mathematics. The conclusion drawn is that some statements of pure mathematics are objectively true. A key principle assumed is that if one statement logically implies a second, then if the first is objectively true so is the second. A question about this principle is raised and answered. The problem with the argument is with the second premise.
|Keywords||putnam carnap realism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Confirmation and the Indispensability of Mathematics to Science.Susan Vineberg - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):263.
Scientific Vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument.Michael Resnik - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174.
Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument(S). A Detailed Reconstruction.Jürgen Dümont - 1999 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):341-364.
Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Mark Colyvan - 2011 - In E. J. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Inference to the Best Explanation and Mathematical Realism.Sorin Ioan Bangu - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):13-20.
Stewart Shapiro. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology.O. Linnebo - 2003 - Philosophia Mathematica 11 (1):92-103.
The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism.G. H. Merrill - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (1):69-81.
Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - rodopi.
Platonism and Anti-Platonism: Why Worry?Mary Leng - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):65 – 84.
Putnam, Peano, and the Malin Génie: Could We Possibly Bewrong About Elementary Number-Theory? [REVIEW]Christopher Norris - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):289-321.
Added to index2011-04-27
Total downloads104 ( #48,862 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,251 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?