Minds, substances, and capacities

This paper pushes to the claim that the following is Descartes’s fundamental thesis: something has self-presenting states and self-presenting states only. Were he to have established this he would have revamped our worldview in essentially the manner he wished to revamp it. From this proposition one can get an argument for the substance view of the mind in Descartes’s writings.
Keywords Descartes  Ryle  Armstrong  substance  capacity
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DOI 10.2307/2107216
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