Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63 (2007)

Authors
Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Abstract
Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends that result to show us that ‘believes’ has no transparent sense. Criticisms of this argument are either based on unwarranted assertions or on definitions of key terms that depart from Quine’s usage of those terms.
Keywords Quine  Mackie  transparent sense of belief  opaque sense of belief
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DOI 10.12775/LLP.2007.002
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
The Cement of the Universe.J. L. Mackie - 1974 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.

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