In Hassan Sharifi (ed.), From Meaning to Sound: Proceedings of the 1974 Mid-American Linguistics Conference, 5: 38-40. college of arts and sciences, university of nebraska (1975)

Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Quine’s way of dealing with the semantical paradoxes (Ways of Paradox, pp. 9-10) is criticized. The criticism is based on three premises: (1) no learnable language has infinitely many semantical primitives; (2) any language of which Quine’s theory is true has infinitely many semantical primitives; (3) English is a learnable language. The conclusion drawn is that Quine’s theory is not true of English.
Keywords Quine  Davidson  semantical paradoxes
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