Being Realistic About Reasons

Oxford University Press (2014)

Abstract
It is often claimed that irreducibly normative truths would have unacceptable metaphysical implications, and are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. The book argues, on the basis of a general account of the relevance of ontological questions, that this claim is mistaken. It is also a mistake to think that interpreting normative judgments as beliefs would make it impossible to explain their connection with action. An agent’s acceptance of a normative judgment can explain that agent’s subsequent action because it is part of being a rational agent that such an agent’s beliefs about reasons normally, but not invariably, make a difference to the agent’s subsequent behavior. Because facts about reasons are not entities existing apart from us, there is no epistemological problem of how we can “be in touch with” such facts. There are serious worries about normative knowledge, but the problems involved are internal to the normative domain itself. The best solution to these problems would be an overall account of the domain of reasons in normative terms, supported by an argument from reflective equilibrium. But no existing account, constructivist, or based on desires or on an idea of rationality, is plausible, and no alternative is likely to succeed. Conclusions about reasons for action must rest on more piecemeal applications of the method of reflective equilibrium.
Keywords reasons  rationality  normative  ontology  reflective equilibrium  epistemology  constructivism
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ISBN(s) 9780199678488   0199678480   9780198748106
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Epistemology and Determinateness

There is no problem about knowledge of normative truths, or mathematical truths, arising from a difficulty about how we could be in touch with facts about these subjects. Ideally, the possibility of such knowledge could be explained by an overall account of the subject in question, in its ... see more

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Real Definition.Gideon Rosen - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (3):189-209.
Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness.Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.

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