Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (3):259–270 (1998)

Geoffrey Scarre
Durham University
Act-utilitarianism is often criticized as an unreasonably demanding moral philosophy that commits agents to a life of ceaseless and depersonalizing do-gooding. In this essay I argue in Sidgwickian vein that the strenuousness of act-utilitarianism has been greatly exaggerated and that the practical demands of the doctrine in the contemporary world are closer to those of commonsense morality than such critics as Derek Parfit and Brad Hooker allow
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1468-5930.00096
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,095
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
44 ( #242,447 of 2,448,070 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #451,143 of 2,448,070 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes