Knowledge as 'True Belief Plus Individuation' in Plato

Topoi 31 (2):137-149 (2012)

Authors
Theodore Scaltsas
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the ontological status and the nature of the object. Plato explores many alternative candidates of individuation accounts of objects of true belief, which he discards. I conclude with a Platonic sketch of a teleological account of individuation which would satisfy his requirements of turning true belief into knowledge
Keywords Plato  Epistemology  Knowledge  Individuation
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-012-9148-5
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Knowledge as Evidence.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):1-25.
Platonic Studies.Gregory Vlastos - 1973 - [Princeton, N.J.]Princeton University Press.

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