Aboutness and negative truths: a modest strategy for truthmaker theorists

Synthese 195 (8):3685-3722 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


A central problem for any truthmaker theory is the problem of negative truths. In this paper, I develop a novel, piecemeal strategy for solving this problem. The strategy puts central focus on a truth-relevant notion of aboutness within a metaphysically modest version of truthmaker theory and uses key conceptual tools gained by taking a deeper look at the best attempts to solve the problem of intentionality. I begin this task by critically discussing past proposed solutions to P-NEG in light of Russell’s debate with Demos. This reveals a central difficulty with addressing the problem, specifically that one cannot be committed to incompatibility facts in one’s account of negation and of the truth of negative truths. I then present an aboutness-based version of truthmaker theory. Utilising what I call the strict and full account of aboutness, I extract aboutness-based theories of truth and falsity. I use this machinery to present a promising new strategy for solving P-NEG which does not have the problems of alternative approaches. Finally, I present and respond to some potential objections.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,712

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Unstable Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):230-238.
The cost of truthmaker maximalism.Mark Jago - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474.
How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
Negative Truth and Falsehood.Stephen Mumford - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):45 - 71.
Causal grounds for negative truths.Robin Stenwall - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):2973-2989.
The World and Truth About What Is Not.Noël B. Saenz - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):82-98.
How negative truths are made true.Aaron M. Griffith - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):317-335.
"What in the world could correspond to truth?".Drew Khlentzos - 2000 - Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):109-144.
Truthmaking and Fundamentality.A. R. J. Fisher - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):448-473.


Added to PP

124 (#105,412)

6 months
7 (#127,710)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Arthur Schipper
Peking University

Citations of this work

A Theory of Truthmaking: Metaphysics, Ontology, and Reality.Jamin Asay - 2020 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Necessitation and the Changing Past.Arthur Schipper - 2022 - Theoria 88 (5):997-1013.
True by Default.Aaron M. Griffith - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):92-109.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations