Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):562-586 (2006)

Authors
Laura Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Abstract
According to David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, conceptual competence puts one in a position to have a priori knowledge of conditional claims of the form ‘If my environment is thus and so, then water = H2O’. The rationale for this position, I argue, rests on controversial semantic assumptions about the individuation of meanings or concepts. I sketch a new model of conceptual competence, which undermines the apriority of such conditionals.
Keywords CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.459.x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.
On Sense and Intension.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:135-82.
Reference and Description Revisited.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:201-218.

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Citations of this work BETA

Bootstrapping Our Way to Samesaying.Laura Schroeter - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):177-197.

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