Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553 (2010)
Authors
Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside
Abstract
People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it's neither quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right to say that the person lacks the belief.
Keywords Belief
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01381.x
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