A defense of a unificationist theory of explanation

Foundations of Science 10 (4):421-435 (2005)
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Abstract

This paper defends a unificationist theory of explanation. I first explore the notion of understanding entrenched by the unificationist. Then I present an overview of various kinds of causal statements and explanations. It is claimed that only genuine causal law statements have explanatory power. Finally, I attempt to fit causal explanations into the unificationist theory of explanation. In this way, I try to provide an account of how causal explanations provide understanding of the phenomena that they explain.

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Grounding Functionalism and Explanatory Unificationism.Alexios Stamatiadis-bréhier - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-21.

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