- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
A Defence of AI-Functionalism Against Brandom’s Arguments from Holism and the Frame Problem
Dialogue 50 (4):741-750 (2011)
Abstract
ABSTRACT: Brandom argues that functionalism must ultimately fail because it will not be able to explain how we can holistically update our beliefs solely in terms of abilities possessed by non-linguistic things. In this paper I respond to this argument by arguing that non-linguistic animals encounter and overcome an analogous sort of holistic updating problem. I will also try to demystify holism and de-intellectualize language use/reasoningAuthor's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
Sensory holism and functionalism.Joseph Thomas Tolliver - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):972-973.
Holism, functionalism and visual awareness.Erik Myin - 1998 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 31 (1):3-19.
What’s the Problem with the Frame Problem?Sheldon J. Chow - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):309-331.
Empirical functionalism and conceivability arguments.H. Jacoby - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):271-82.
The frame problem and the treatment of prediction.Mark Sprevak - 2005 - In L. Magnani & R. Dossena (eds.), Computing, Philosophy and Cognition. pp. 4--349.
Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief.Carlo Penco - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):177-201.
The frame problem and theories of belief.Scott Hendricks - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):317-33.
Robert Brandom on Communication, Reference, and Objectivity.Bernd Prien - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):433-458.
The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy.Jarek Gryz - 2013 - Filozofia Nauki 21 (2):15-30.
The frame problem blues. Once more, with feeling.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1996 - In K. M. Ford & Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence. Ablex.
Normative Functionalism in the Pittsburgh School.Patrick J. Reider - 2012 - Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.
Analytics
Added to PP
2012-03-31
Downloads
29 (#521,313)
6 months
2 (#1,157,335)
2012-03-31
Downloads
29 (#521,313)
6 months
2 (#1,157,335)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
References found in this work
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Modules, frames, fridgeons, sleeping dogs, and the music of the spheres.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma: the Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence. Ablex. pp. 139--49.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6d9b7f7c4c-tstkh uwo