Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 13 (3-4):293-306 (2018)

Authors
Lukas Schwengerer
University of Duisburg-Essen
Abstract
In 'The Grasshopper' Suits proposes that ‘playing a game’ can be captured as an attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs (prelusory goal), using only means permitted by rules (lusory means). These rules prohibit more efficient means, and are accepted because they make the activity possible (lusory attitude). I argue these conditions are not jointly sufficient. The starting point for the argument is the idea that goals, means and attitudes can pick out their content in different ways. They can involve a direct reference (‘crossing this specific finish line’), or a description that picks out something (‘crossing a line on the track after running 100 m’). I provide cases in which one’s attitudes, accepted goals or accepted means pick out their content by a description such that the person does not play a game, even if Suits’s conditions are satisfied. I show that this demands an epistemic condition for playing a game that also applies to commitment based accounts. Finally, I discuss what such an epistemic condition could be. I argue that the condition does not require personal knowledge of all goals and means, but merely enough epistemic access that the goal and permissible means can guide one’s behavior safely enough. This might be satisfied by social extensions, such as access to tools (e.g. a rulebook) or other people (e.g. referees).
Keywords Games  Playing a game  Bernard Suits
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1080/17511321.2018.1515977
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,673
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Game-Players and Game-Playing: A Response to Kreider.Richard Royce - 2013 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 40 (2):225 - 239.
Aesthetic Imagination in Football.Lev Kreft - 2015 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 9 (2):124-139.
Knowledge Condition Games.Sieuwert van Otterloo, Wiebe Van Der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):425-452.
Games and the Good.Thomas Hurka - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):217-235.
The Paradoxes of Utopian Game-Playing.Deborah P. Vossen - 2017 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44 (3):315-328.
Games, Rules, and Practices.Yuval Eylon & Amir Horowitz - 2018 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 12 (3):241-254.
On the Relationship Between Philosophy and Game-Playing.Yuanfan Huang & Emily Ryall - 2017 - In Wendy Russell, Emily Ryall & Malcolm MacLean (eds.), The Philosophy of Play as Life. London: Routledge. pp. 80-93.
Games and the Good.Thomas Hurka & John Tasioulas - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 80:217-264.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-09-17

Total views
40 ( #273,772 of 2,462,325 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #299,152 of 2,462,325 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes