Episteme:1-20 (forthcoming)

Tom Schoonen
University of Amsterdam
Pretense imagination is imagination understood as the ability to recreate rational belief revision. This kind of imagination is used in pretend-play, risk-assessment, etc. Some even claim that this kind of hypothetical belief revision can be grounds to justify new beliefs in conditionals, in particular conditionals that play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. In this paper, I will argue that it cannot. I will first provide a very general theory of pretense imagination, which I formalise using tools from dynamic epistemic logic. As a result, we can clearly see that pretense imagination episodes are build up out of two kinds of imaginative stages, so I will present an argument by cases. This argument shows that pretense imagination might indeed provide us with justification for believing certain conditionals. Despite this, I will argue that these are not the kind of conditionals that allow pretense imagination to play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/epi.2021.2
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,401
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Imagination and Other Scripts.Eric Funkhouser & Shannon Spaulding - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):291-314.
Pretense and Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 2 (1):79-94.
What It Is to Pretend.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):397-420.
Imagination in Action.Philipp Dorstewitz - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):385-405.
Che cos’è uno stato mentale fittizio?Daniela Tagliafico - 2013 - Rivista di Estetica 53:109-134.
The Heterogeneity of the Imagination.Amy Kind - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159.
Imagination is Where the Action Is.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):55-77.
Imaginative Contagion.Tamar Szabo Gendler - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.
L’impegno ontologico del pretense.Gaetano Albergo - 2013 - Rivista di Estetica 53:155-177.
Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Imagination Box.Shen-yi Liao & Tyler Doggett - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):259-275.
Logic in the Land of Make-Believe.Stephen Pollard - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.


Added to PP index

Total views
10 ( #869,796 of 2,445,485 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #67,511 of 2,445,485 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes