Authors
Henry Ian Schiller
Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract
Act-based theories of content hold that propositions are identical to acts of predication that we perform in thought and talk. To undergo an occurrent thought with a particular content just is to perform the act of predication that individuates that content. But identifying the content of a thought with the performance of an act of predication makes it difficult to explain the intentionality of bouletic mental activity, like wanting and desiring. In this paper, I argue that this difficulty is insurmountable: the contents of occurrent desires cannot be determined by acts of predication.
Keywords desire  occurrent attitudes  propositions  act theory  intentionality  mental representation
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DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2019.1667864
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1970 - Princeton University Press.
The Reference Book.John Hawthorne & David Manley - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA

Content Pluralism.Alex Grzankowski & Ray Buchanan - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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