Philosophy of Science 36 (2):127-144 (1969)

This paper is a critique of Kenneth Arrow's thesis concerning the logical impossibility of a constitution. I argue that one of the premises of Arrow's proof, that of the transitivity of indifference, is untenable. Several concepts of preference are introduced and counter-instances are offered to the transitivity of indifference defined along the standard lines in terms of these concepts. Alternate analyses of indifference in terms of preference are considered, and it is shown that these do not serve Arrow's purposes either. Finally, it is argued that in the single special case in which indifference could plausibly be held to be transitive, Arrow's thesis is innocuous
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/288241
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,593
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Democracy and Interdependent Preferences.Frederic Schick - 1972 - Theory and Decision 3 (1):55-75.
An Introduction to Allan Gibbard’s Harvard Seminar Paper.John A. Weymark - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):263-268.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Note on Introducing a 'Zero-Line' of Welfare as an Escape-Route From Arrow's Theorem.Christian List - 2001 - Pacific Economic Review (Special Section in Honour of Amartya Sen) 6 (2):223-238.
Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Does a Computer Have an Arrow of Time?Owen J. E. Maroney - 2010 - Foundations of Physics 40 (2):205-238.
Teaching Arrow’s Theorem.Greg Fried - 2010 - Teaching Philosophy 33 (2):173-186.
Zagzebski on the Arrow of Time.Hugh Rice - 2005 - Faith and Philosophy 22 (3):363-369.


Added to PP index

Total views
55 ( #176,533 of 2,385,759 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #559,864 of 2,385,759 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes