A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports

Noûs 40 (2):361-368 (2006)
Abstract
(1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms
Keywords Belief  Direct  Epistemology  Proposition  Reference  Report  Term
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DOI 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00614.x
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References found in this work BETA
The Things We Mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Understanding Belief Reports.David M. Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
Belief Ascription.Stephen Schiffer - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.

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Citations of this work BETA
Specifying Desires.Delia Graff Fara - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):250-272.
Illogical, but Rational.David Braun - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):376–379.
On Non-Pragmatic Millianism.Andrea Onofri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.
How to Become an Enlightened Millian Heir.Philip Atkins - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):927-934.

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Acceptance and Deciding to Believe.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
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Direct Reference and Singular Propositions.Matthew Davidson - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):285-300.
Direct Reference in Thought and Speech.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1993 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 26 (1):49-76.
Understanding Belief Reports.David M. Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.

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