A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports

Noûs 40 (2):361-368 (2006)
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Abstract

(1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms

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Stephen Schiffer
New York University

References found in this work

Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
The things we mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Belief ascription.Stephen Schiffer - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.

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