A puzzle for particulars?

Axiomathes 18 (1):49-65 (2008)

Richard Brian Davis
Tyndale University College
In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red1—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red1 is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete particular and its property instances aren’t genuinely related. We argue that Preston’s proffered solution here—to treat property instances as “mental constructs”—is fraught with difficulty. We then go on to show how, by fine-tuning the nature of bare particulars, treating them as abstract modes of things rather than concrete particulars, the traditional realist can neatly evade Preston’s puzzle.
Keywords Property instances  Realism  Bare particulars  Individuation
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-007-9018-8
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References found in this work BETA

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
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Citations of this work BETA

No Bare Particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (2):149-159.
The Essentialist Inference.Jesse M. Mulder - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):755-769.
Are Bare Particulars Constituents?Richard Brian Davis - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):395-410.

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