A puzzle for particulars?

Axiomathes 18 (1):49-65 (2008)
In this paper we examine a puzzle recently posed by Aaron Preston for the traditional realist assay of property (quality) instances. Consider Socrates (a red round spot) and red1—Socrates’ redness. For the traditional realist, both of these entities are concrete particulars. Further, both involve redness being `tied to’ the same bare individuator. But then it appears that red1 is duplicated in its ‘thicker’ particular (Socrates), so that it can’t be predicated of Socrates without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete particular and its property instances aren’t genuinely related. We argue that Preston’s proffered solution here—to treat property instances as “mental constructs”—is fraught with difficulty. We then go on to show how, by fine-tuning the nature of bare particulars, treating them as abstract modes of things rather than concrete particulars, the traditional realist can neatly evade Preston’s puzzle.
Keywords Property instances  Realism  Bare particulars  Individuation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10516-007-9018-8
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,470
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
Theodore Sider (2006). Bare Particulars. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jesse M. Mulder (2013). The Essentialist Inference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):755-769.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

102 ( #45,586 of 1,925,580 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #96,346 of 1,925,580 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.