Are virtues no more than dispositions to obey moral rules?

Philosophia 20 (1-2):195-207 (1990)
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Abstract

Virtues are standardly understood as (1) essentially dispositions to perform certain actions and (2) having only instrumental value as motives to fulfill moral duties which can be fulfilled by persons lacking the virtue because the duties mandate only certain act-types. The argument of this article is that the duties of beneficence, gratitude and self-respect cannot be stated in terms of obligatory act-types because they cannot be fulfilled (except in deficient form) by persons lacking the appropriate virtue; they are, rather, duties to cultivate specific virtues which therefore cannot themselves be defined in terms of obligatory actions

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Walter Schaller
Texas Tech University

Citations of this work

The good engineer: Giving virtue its due in engineering ethics.Charles E. Harris - 2008 - Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (2):153-164.
Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue.Jason Kawall - 2003 - Environmental Ethics 25 (4):339-358.
From Duty, Moral Worth, Good Will.Howard J. Curzer - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (2):287-322.

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References found in this work

Gratefulness and Gratitude.A. D. M. Walker - 1981 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:39 - 55.
Servility, critical deference and the deferential wife.Marcia Baron - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (3):393 - 400.
Utilitarianism and virtue.John Kilcullen - 1982 - Ethics 93 (3):451-466.

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