Basic deviance reconsidered

Analysis 67 (3):186–194 (2007)
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Abstract

Most contemporary philosophers of action agree on the following claims. Firstly, the possibility of deviant or wayward causal chains poses a serious problem for the standard-causal theory of action. Secondly, we can distinguish between different kinds of deviant causal chains in the theory of action. In particular, we can distinguish between cases of basic and cases of consequential deviance. Thirdly, the problem of consequential deviance admits of a fairly straightforward solution, whereas the possibility of basic deviance constitutes a separate and difficult problem that requires its own solution. I will argue that the problem of basic deviance is no more troublesome than the problem of consequential deviance, as a solution to the former is implicit in the standard solution to the latter.

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Citations of this work

Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):101-26.
The contours of control.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.
Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mindlessness.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.

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References found in this work

Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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