Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2008)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and even quantifiers. Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been very far developed. As argued within, expressivists have not yet even managed to solve the "negation problem" - to explain why atomic normative sentences are inconsistent with their negations. As a result, it is far from clear that expressivism even could be true, let alone whether it is. Being For seeks to evaluate the semantic commitments of expressivism, by showing how an expressivist semantics would work, what it can do, and what kind of assumptions would be required, in order for it to do it. Building on a highly general understanding of the basic ideas of expressivism, it argues that expressivists can solve the negation problem - but only in one kind of way. It shows how this insight paves the way for an explanatorily powerful, constructive expressivist semantics, which solves many of what have been taken to be the deepest problems for expressivism. But it also argues that no account with these advantages can be generalized to deal with constructions like tense, modals, or binary quantifiers. Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but false
|
Keywords | Expression (Philosophy Semantics (Philosophy |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2010 |
Buy this book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
Call number | B105.E95.S37 2008 |
ISBN(s) | 9780199534654 0199534659 9780199588008 0199588007 |
DOI | 10.1093/analys/anp155 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
View all 112 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
How to Be an Expressivist About Truth.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 282--298.
Expression for Expressivists.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):86–116.
Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals.Benjamin Schnieder - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615.
How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):573-599.
Expressivism, Inferentialism, and the Theory of Meaning.Matthew Chrisman - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Schroeder on Expressivism: For – or Against? [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):117-129.
The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism.Michael Ridge - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
156 ( #74,007 of 2,498,770 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #102,173 of 2,498,770 )
2009-01-28
Total views
156 ( #74,007 of 2,498,770 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #102,173 of 2,498,770 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads