Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1103-1118 (2016)

Authors
Ian Schnee
University of Washington
Abstract
Many epistemologists have recently defended views on which all evidence is true or perceptual reasons are facts. On such views a common account of basic perceptual reasons is that the fact that one sees that p is one’s reason for believing that p. I argue that that account is wrong; rather, in the basic case the fact that p itself is one’s reason for believing that p. I show that my proposal is better motivated, solves a fundamental objection that the received view faces, and illuminates the nature of reasons for belief
Keywords Reasons  Inference  Knowledge  Belief  Justification  Circularity
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0532-z
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick Milton Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Everything is Self-Evident.Steven Diggin - 2021 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (4):413-426.

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