Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657 (2015)

Authors
Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
This paper is about the connection between rationality and accuracy. I show that one natural picture about how rationality and accuracy are connected emerges if we assume that rational agents are rationally omniscient. I then develop an alternative picture that allows us to relax this assumption, in order to accommodate certain views about higher order evidence
Keywords Rationality  Accuracy  Higher order evidence  Epistemic consequentialism
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil20151121242
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.

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