Philosophia 43 (1):197-204 (2015)

Authors
Eugene Schlossberger
Purdue University Calumet
Abstract
The paper argues first that, by not rescuing innocents in certain ways , God violates a weak Bad Samaritan principle that few would deny. This ‘Bad Samaritan argument’ appears to block the traditional free will defense to the problem of evil, since respecting the principle does not violate or show lack of respect for free will. Second, the paper articulates a version of the traditional argument from evil, the ‘Aftertaste argument’, that appears to close some of the traditional loopholes in the argument from evil, such as the ‘greater good from evil’ defense
Keywords Argument from evil  Free will  Existence of God
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9572-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,856
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Must God Create the Best?Robert Merrihew Adams - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (3):317-332.
Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse.Klaas J. Kraay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):355 - 368.
Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments From Evil.Michael J. Almeida & Graham Oppy - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516.
Can God Be Free?William L. Rowe - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):405-424.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-11-20

Total views
105 ( #93,140 of 2,401,722 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #56,977 of 2,401,722 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes