S produces the sounds “It’s snowing” in the presence of A, and A instantaneously comes to know that it’s snowing. S has communicated to, or told, A that it’s snowing, and, as a result of S’s speech act, A came to know that it was snowing. Philosophical interest in communication turns on four inter-related questions. The first is about the logical structure of communication, or, more specifically, about whether communication is a relation that holds among three things just in case the first communicated the second to the third. The second is about the explication, or analysis, of communication. The third is about the role of communication in the explication of linguistic meaning. And the fourth is about how knowledge is acquired by communication. The questions are interrelated in that answers to any one question may constrain answers to one or more of the others.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 83,802

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.


Added to PP

150 (#98,506)

6 months
3 (#241,900)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Schiffer
New York University

Citations of this work

Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.
Reconsidering the role of inference to the best explanation in the epistemology of testimony.Axel Gelfert - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):386-396.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references