Counterfactuals and Arbitrariness

Mind 123 (492):1021-1055 (2014)
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Abstract

The pattern of credences we are inclined to assign to counterfactuals challenges standard accounts of counterfactuals. In response to this problem, the paper develops a semantics of counterfactuals in terms of the epsilon-operator. The proposed semantics stays close to the standard account: the epsilon-operator substitutes the universal quantifier present in standard semantics by arbitrarily binding the open world-variable. Various applications of the suggested semantics are explored including, in particular, an explanation of how the puzzling credences in counterfactuals come about

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Moritz Schulz
Universität Hamburg

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.

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