Can brains in vats think as a team?

Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):201-218 (2003)
Abstract The specter of the ?group mind? or ?collective subject? plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality does not necessarily have to get stuck with some collectivist super-agent. Rather, the specter of the group mind arises from a deep-seated ?Cartesian? preconception concerning intentionality, which we should try to overcome. *I am greatly indebted to Raimo Tuomela for his comments. Also, I wish to thank Michael Bratman, Fabienne Peter, Richard Raatzsch and Katrin Meyer
Keywords Collective  Group  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Mind
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DOI 10.1080/10002003098538750
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References found in this work BETA
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.Michael Sandel - 2003 - In Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. Routledge, in Association with the Open University. pp. 336-343.
Rationality in Action: A Symposium.John R. Searle, Barry Smith, Leo Zaibert & Josef Moural - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66 – 94.

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