Contrastive causation

Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358 (2005)
Abstract
Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are nonempty sets of contrast events. Or at least, I will argue that treating causation as contrastive helps resolve some paradoxes.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1215/00318108-114-3-327
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,169
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Grounding in the Image of Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
Dissecting Explanatory Power.Petri Ylikoski & Jaakko Kuorikoski - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):201–219.
Omissions as Possibilities.Sara Bernstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-23.

View all 71 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
489 ( #3,972 of 2,191,856 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #17,019 of 2,191,856 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature