Contrastive causation

Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358 (2005)
Authors
Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are nonempty sets of contrast events. Or at least, I will argue that treating causation as contrastive helps resolve some paradoxes.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-114-3-327
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Grounding in the Image of Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
Kind‐Dependent Grounding.Alex Moran - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):359-390.
Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.

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