Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358 (2005)

Authors
Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are nonempty sets of contrast events. Or at least, I will argue that treating causation as contrastive helps resolve some paradoxes.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-114-3-327
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Grounding in the Image of Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
Metaphysical Causation.Alastair Wilson - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):723-751.
The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
Dissecting Explanatory Power.Petri Ylikoski & Jaakko Kuorikoski - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):201–219.
Grounding Is Not Causation.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):21-38.

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