Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality

Abstract
Many recent political philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that choice and responsibility can be incorporated into the framework of an egalitarian theory of distributive justice. This article argues, however, that the project of developing a responsibility-based conception of egalitarian justice is misconceived. The project represents an attempt to defuse conservative criticism of the welfare state and of egalitarian liberalism more generally. But by mimicking the conservative’s emphasis on choice and responsibility, advocates of responsibility-based egalitarianism unwittingly inherit the conservative’s unsustainable justificatory ambitions, unattractive moralism, and questionable metaphysical commitments. More importantly, they misrepresent the nature of our concern with equality as a value
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DOI 10.1177/1470594X05049434
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Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice.Serena Olsaretti - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):165-188.
Public Health Ethics and Liberalism.Lubomira Radoilska - 2009 - Public Health Ethics 2 (2):135-145.
The Relational Approach to Egalitarian Justice: A Critique of Luck Egalitarianism.Takashi Kibe - 2011 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (1):1-21.

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