Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality

Authors
Samuel Scheffler
New York University
Abstract
Many recent political philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that choice and responsibility can be incorporated into the framework of an egalitarian theory of distributive justice. This article argues, however, that the project of developing a responsibility-based conception of egalitarian justice is misconceived. The project represents an attempt to defuse conservative criticism of the welfare state and of egalitarian liberalism more generally. But by mimicking the conservative’s emphasis on choice and responsibility, advocates of responsibility-based egalitarianism unwittingly inherit the conservative’s unsustainable justificatory ambitions, unattractive moralism, and questionable metaphysical commitments. More importantly, they misrepresent the nature of our concern with equality as a value
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/1470594X05049434
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,741
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice.Serena Olsaretti - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):165-188.
Distributive and Relational Equality.C. Schemmel - 2012 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (2):123-148.
Making Sense of Age-Group Justice.Juliana Bidadanure - 2016 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15 (3):234-260.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
211 ( #23,464 of 2,263,108 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #143,146 of 2,263,108 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature