Abstract

Kant's moral theory demands that we interact with others on the basis of reason rather than force. In deciding what to do, we are to reject any actions which depend for their efficacy upon bypassing the consent of others, whether through deception, coercion, or outright violence. In this sense, Kantianism puts forth a strongly anti-paternalistic, anti-manipulative ideal of human relations. And yet there are many situations in which we feel it can be permissible or even obligatory to act in paternalistic or manipulative ways. When dealing with children, for example, we believe some forms of paternalism are justified and appropriate. Similarly when confronted with moral adversaries, people who are bent on exploiting us and the institutions we care about, we think we can be justified in 'fighting back', at least within certain limits and under certain conditions. ;Utilitarians would argue that our intuitions about these exceptional cases are rooted in considerations about the consequences of our actions. It is for the sake of maximizing good results, they would argue, that we deviate from our ordinary standards when dealing with children and our adversaries. My aim is to show that Kantian theory can allow for a different explanation. I claim that on the Kantian view, these sorts of deviations are necessary in order to preserve the meaning and value of our actions, and in doing so to preserve the connection between who we are and what we do. ;This account is available to the Kantian because Kant's moral theory depends upon the idea that action is essentially meaningful, and that its value is a function of its meaning. I argue that the main rivals of Kantianism, utilitarianism and rationalism, employ conceptions of action which fail to allow for this. As such, they fail to see that the value of our actions depends in a crucial way upon an interpersonal background beyond our control. Where others either cannot or will not do their part in the practice of morality, good actions can lose their proper significance.