Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue?

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):185-215 (2012)
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Abstract 1 This paper makes a preliminary case for a central and radical claim. I begin with Bernard Williams? seldom-faced argument that integrity cannot be a moral virtue because it lacks two key ingredients of moral virtues, namely a characteristic thought and motivation. Whereas, for example, generosity involves the thought that another could use assistance, and the motivation to actually give assistance, integrity lacks these two things essential to morally excellent responses. I show that several maneuvers aimed at avoiding Williams? challenge fail and that others are likely to remain unpersuasive. The paper concludes by offering an argument to the best explanation: Williams? important insight is best explained by the supposition that integrity is an epistemic virtue, and an epistemic virtue of a practical sort



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Author's Profile

Greg Scherkoske
Dalhousie University

Citations of this work

Integrity.Damian Cox - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Authenticity in Political Discourse.Ben Jones - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):489-504.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - 1971 - Oxford,: Harvard University Press. Edited by Steven M. Cahn.

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