In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 235 (2005)

Authors
Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Does G. E. Moore know that he has hands? Yes, says the dogmatist: Moore’s hands are right before his eyes. No, says the skeptic: for all Moore knows he could be a brain-in-a-vat. Yes and no, says the contrastivist: yes, Moore knows that he has hands rather than stumps; but no, Moore does not know that he has hands rather than vat-images of hands. The dogmatist and the skeptic suppose that knowledge is a binary, categorical relation: s knows that p. The contrastivist says that knowledge is a ternary, contrastive relation: s knows that p rather than q.
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1993 - Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.

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Citations of this work BETA

Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Contrastive Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
From Contextualism to Contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.

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